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From a phenomenological perspective, faces are perceived differently from objects as their
perception always involves the possibility of a relational engagement (Bredlau, 2011). This
is especially true for familiar faces, i.e., faces of people with a history of real relational
engagements. Similarly, valence of emotional expressions assumes a key role, as they
define the sense and direction of this engagement. Following these premises, the aim
of the present study is to demonstrate that face recognition is facilitated by at least
two variables, familiarity and emotional expression, and that perception of familiar faces
is not influenced by orientation. In order to verify this hypothesis, we implemented a
3 × 3 × 2 factorial design, showing 17 healthy subjects three type of faces (unfamiliar,
personally familiar, famous) characterized by three different emotional expressions (happy,
hungry/sad, neutral) and in two different orientation (upright vs. inverted). We showed
every subject a total of 180 faces with the instructions to give a familiarity judgment.
Reaction times (RTs) were recorded and we found that the recognition of a face is
facilitated by personal familiarity and emotional expression, and that this process is
otherwise independent from a cognitive elaboration of stimuli and remains stable despite
orientation. These results highlight the need to make a distinction between famous and
personally familiar faces when studying face perception and to consider its historical
aspects from a phenomenological point of view.
Keywords: face recognition, familiarity, inversion, facial expression, person, phenomenology
INTRODUCTION
Face recognition is an essential task for human daily life as it
allows the identification of the person in front of you and provides
the possibility of a relational engagement (Kleinke, 1986). Several
types of information can be extracted from the perception of a
face, ranging from age, gender and emotional states, but above
all, identity (Morrison et al., 2001; Jenkins and Burton, 2008).
Faces constitute a separate perceptual category, differing in many
aspects from other stimuli, such as objects (Tanaka and Sengco,
1997). They are perceived holistically, in contrast with other
objects, which receive an elaboration based on the processing
of constitutive details (Tanaka and Sengco, 1997; Farah et al.,
1998; Ge et al., 2006). Face perception is defined as “holistic”
because faces are processed as gestalts, with single facial features
(nose, mouth, eyes and so on) having a less fundamental role
in respect to the global face configuration (Maurer et al., 2002).
The result is that any kind of experimental manipulation pre-
venting this kind of elaboration could result in an impairment
in making a judgment about face identity. The most studied of
these manipulations is the so called “face inversion effect”. This
mechanism prevents the possibility to encode spatial information
and causes the inability to perceive individual faces as a whole,
forcing stimulus processing based on a system of specific and
integrated features. This usually results in lower accuracy and
slower reaction times (RTs; Valentine, 1988). Some interesting
findings have been found in presenting inverted faces to patients
with prosopagnosia, a neurological disorder characterized by the
inability to recognize faces (Bauer, 1984; Grüter et al., 2008;
Gainotti, 2014). Patients with congenital (Rivolta et al., 2012) and
acquired prosopagnosia (Busigny and Rossion, 2010), show not
to have holistic perceptual processing abilities, being minimally (if
at all) affected by face inversion. Furthermore, some studies show
better performance for inverted than upright faces, though this
latter effect is not very common in either form of prosopagnosia
(Farah et al., 1995a; Behrmann et al., 2005; Busigny and Rossion,
2010).
Besides the perceptual aspects of face recognition, great inter-
est has been shown in the study of the elaboration of the so called
“emotional valence” (Bruce and Young, 1986). Traditional cogni-
tive models of face recognition speculate that facial identity and
facial expressions are processed through different routes. Bruce
and Young (1986), hypothesized the existence of two distinct
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elaboration pathways: one involved in identity recognition, the
other in the analysis of facial expressions. The model is supported
by clinical (Young et al., 1993), neurophysiological (Hasselmo
et al., 1989) and neuroradiological (Winston et al., 2004) evi-
dence, leading also to the formulation of a distributed neural
system of face recognition (Haxby et al., 2000; Rivolta et al., 2014).
However, there are some experimental evidences that undermine
the dual route hypothesis. Many studies have shown an influence
of facial expressions on identity recognition of newly learned faces
(Foa et al., 2000; D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2007) and of
famous faces (Gallegos and Tranel, 2005). Moreover, Van de Stock
demonstrated that face identity perception mechanisms interact
not only with the processing of facial expressions but also with
bodily expressions (Van de Stock and de Gelder, 2014).
Some attention has also been concentrated on the study of
emotional recognition in inverted faces. Literature on this topic
is quite heterogeneous: while some studies found a detrimental
effect of inversion only for the recognition of some emotional
expressions (McKelvie, 1995; Calvo and Nummenmaa, 2008),
some others found a general difficulty in recognizing inverted
expressions for all types of emotions (Goren and Wilson, 2006).
However, the most acknowledged idea is that the only expression
not affected by inversion is happiness (Leppänen and Hietanen,
2004; Bombari et al., 2013). A limit of the above presented studies
is that a distinction has not been made between famous and
personally familiar faces, since the recognition of these two types
of stimuli may differ in various aspects. In this regard, Herzmann
et al. (2004), studied RTs, priming, and skin conductance response
to unfamiliar, famous and personally familiar faces. They found
faster RTs for both famous and personally familiar faces, but a
greater skin conductance only for this last category. Moreover,
recognition of personally familiar and famous faces seems to
be based in different neurological areas. Taylor et al. (2009), in
an fMRI study, compared unknown, famous and familiar faces,
finding that the extent and areas of activation varied according to
face type.
The three types of stimuli appear to be profoundly different
if considered from a phenomenological perspective. Phenomeno-
logical theories claim that perception is an active process, struc-
turally embodied, embedded, extended and enactive,1 and that
person recognition is different from object recognition.
What we perceive is determined by what we can do, and this
is valid for both objects and people (Noë, 2004): the difference
is that while an object reveals itself in a pattern of possibilities of
action, a face reveals itself in a pattern of relational possibilities.
In fact, in encountering another person the most pressing task
is relational engagement. In these terms it appears clear why
familiar faces are different from famous and unknown faces:
1Roughly, defining perception as embodied means to consider the important
role of the body shape in perceiving and experiencing the world and how
we act in it. The idea that perception is embedded (and, on this ground, also
“extended”) claims that perception is always situated in the environment: the
objects (or events) are not isolated entities but instead, in Heidegger words,
“at hand”, i.e., available to manipulation, and in this sense, they shape our
perceptions and actions. Enactive dimension of perception reveals that it is not
merely analysis of actual physical features of objects but perception calling for
action. For more detailed explanations see Gallagher (2008) and Noë (2004).
if we encounter a familiar person (i.e., a person who has a
history of real relational engagements with us) many ways of
being in engagement become vivid and start to pertain to our
personal experience and to its significance. In observing a familiar
person we experience ourselves in our personal possibilities of
relational engagement. In this way, particular importance is given
to the processing of emotional expressions, because they define
the “sense”2 of this engagement (Bredlau, 2011). We therefore
hypothesize that familiarity is a so powerful constituent of face
perception to overcome the effect of the inversion of the stimulus
and to be not influenced by emotional expressions.
Therefore, the aim of the present study is to investigate whether
manipulations of orientation and expressions can influence the
processing of facial identity of unfamiliar, personally familiar and
famous faces. Our hypothesis is that inversion does not affect the
vivid experiential perception of a familiar face, leading to similar
RTs for inverted, compared to upright familiar faces. For this
purpose, we presented our subjects with pictures of unfamiliar,
famous and personally familiar faces, both upright and inverted,
with three different emotional expressions: happy, neutral and
sad/angry. The main element of evaluation was the RTs of our
subjects during a face recognition task.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Seventeen adults (5 male; 12 female), with normal or correct-
to-normal vision, ranging in age from 23 to 36 (M = 27.7,
DS = 2.43 years), participated in this study. All participants were
unaware of the purpose of the experiment. The study conformed
to the national guidelines and regulations of the A.I.P. (Italian
Association of Psychology), and was approved by the Lombard
School of Psychotherapy ethical review committee. All subjects
gave informed consent.
STIMULI
Visual stimuli consisted of digitalized grayscale images of famil-
iar, famous and unknown faces, displaying positive, negative or
neutral expressions. All images were selected for high-resolution
frontal views and forward eye-gaze. Pictures were homogenized
for average brightness and contrast, and did not show significant
differences in these parameters across categories. In accordance
with the purpose of this study we avoided removing hair, glasses
or other distinctive features from the portraits, in order to keep
an authentic approach to face perception.
Familiar faces. These highly familiar faces consisted of pictures
of 10 familiar people for each subject. The choice of familiar
people was based on a questionnaire previously filled by the
participants, which were asked to indicate 10 relatives or signifi-
cant others (e.g., spouse, partner, etc.). The researchers contacted
each familiar person and photographed them with three different
expressions (positive, negative and neutral) making a total of 30
photos. Originally relatives were asked to pose happy, angry and
neutral expressions. Nevertheless, due to subjects’ difficulty in
reproducing intentionally a unequivocal angry faces we chose to
2Here we use the word “sense” to explain the idea of direction, purpose,
motivation etc.
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categorize those facial expressions (and therefore also the others)
on emotional valence (positive, negative and neutral) rather than
on discrete emotional states. So, our negative familiar stimuli
can encompass both angry and sad faces. Difficulty in producing
negative expressions on command is shown in other studies
(Öhman et al., 2001). All familiar people gave informed consent.
Famous faces. Famous people were selected for use in this
experiment on the basis of findings from a pilot study. Sixteen
celebrities, appearing regularly in the media (politicians, actors,
television celebrities etc.), were chosen: three images for each
celebrity, judged by the authors as having neutral, positive and
negative expressions were downloaded from the Internet. Fifty-
one subjects (32 female, 19 male), outside the study, were asked to
rate portraits for notoriety and emotional expressions (as positive,
negative or neutral). For each face, participants were asked to
answer the question: “What’s the name of this person?” and to
rate their notoriety on a Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (not at
all familiar) to 6 (very familiar). To assess emotional expressions,
participants were asked to judge if the expressions were positive,
negative or neutral. The final stimulus set comprised 10 (5 male
and 5 female) of the 16 celebrities who met the following criteria:
identity recognized by 100% of participants and each emotional
expression correctly rated by 85% of participants.
Unknown faces. 10 unknown faces were included in the exper-
iment (for each participant we used photos of relatives and the
significant others of other subjects).
In total, 90 stimuli were used of 10 personally familiar, 10
famous and 10 faces unknown to the participants. Each face
displayed the three expressions, and each stimuli were presented
upright and inverted, for a total of 180 pictures (see Figure 1 for
an example) and presented in a single session.
PROCEDURE
As participants arrived at the laboratory, they read the infor-
mation sheet, completed the consent form and were informed
that they would perform computer-based tasks. Participants were
seated in a quiet room, approximately 60 cm from the screen, and
viewed all 180 images in one continuous block. All images were
presented once for 5000 ms in randomized order with a black
inter-stimulus slide lasting 2000 ms (Figure 2). Participants were
instructed to press, as quickly as possible, one of two keys (B and
M-counterbalanced response across subjects) in agreement with
subjective recognition judgment (whether the face was known or
not). No training was given to the participants prior to the facial
recognition task.
REACTION TIME
Participants RTs were recorded by the Tobii Studio 1750 eye
tracker software. Raw data of RTs were exported from Tobii
Studio and processed using an ad-hoc software module developed
with Microsoft Access. The obtained results were then adapted
to SPSS databases in order to further explore the data through
statistical analyses.
STATISTICS
Data analyses were performed using SPSS Statistics for Windows.
Statistical analysis was performed on the logarithmic trans-
formed data of RTs. The main purpose of this log transformation
FIGURE 1 | Example of stimuli images.
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FIGURE 2 | Example of experiment.
is to get the sampled data in line with the assumptions of
parametric statistics (such as ANOVA) and to deal with out-
liers. A 3 (class: familiar/famous/unknown) × 3 (expression:
positive/negative/neutral) × 2 (orientation: upright/inverted)
repeated measures ANOVA explored whether RTs differed per
stimuli. Stimulus type (familiar, famous and unknown), expres-
sions (positive, negative and neutral) and orientation (upright
and inverted) were entered as within-subjects variables. Effect
sizes (partial eta-squared, η2p, for F-statistics) are reported
together with p-values for significant main effects and interac-
tions, and post-hoc t-tests were Bonferroni-corrected to require
a significance value of p < 0.01. An η2p value above 0.01 indicates
a small effect, a η2p above 0.06 a medium effect, and a η
2
p above
0.14 a large effect. We used Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity to test
the assumption of sphericity, if this assumption is violated, the
F-statistic is positively biased rendering it invalid and increasing
the risk of a Type I error. To overcome this problem, Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to the degrees of freedom (df ).
RESULTS
Table 1 shows mean values of reaction times.
This analysis revealed the main effects of Orientation
[F(1,169) = 167.04, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.50], Class [F(1.87,315.39)
= 69.80, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.29] and Expression [F(2,338) = 5.62,
p = 0.004, η2p = 0.03]. Pairwise comparisons (Figure 3) reveal that
RTs in upright condition were lower than in inverted condition
(p < 0.001); RTs in detecting familiar faces were significantly
faster compared to both famous (p < 0.001) and unknown faces
(p < 0.001). RTs were faster for famous compared to unknown
(p = 0.001); and for positive compared to neutral (p = 0.01)
Table 1 | Means and standard error for reaction times.
Orientation Class Expression Mean Std. error
Upright Familiar Positive 775.91 21.20
Neutral 808.01 18.14
Negative 729.13 17.41
Famous Positive 825.49 26.50
Neutral 834.79 27.53
Negative 822.16 25.94
Unknown Positive 822.83 10.32
Neutral 827.08 13.45
Negative 856.63 16.43
Inverted Familiar Positive 764.48 21.23
Neutral 811.35 30.37
Negative 757.09 23.37
Famous Positive 978.05 36.06
Neutral 987.24 37.12
Negative 1057.05 46.32
Unknown Positive 1016.90 27.41
Neutral 1105.05 30.09
Negative 1165.89 40.13
and negative expressions (p = 0.01). No differences were found
between neutral and negative expressions (p > 0.05). Analysis
revealed that all two-way interactions were significant (Orien-
tation × Expression [F(2,338) = 11.16, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.06];
Orientation × Class [F(1.74,293.76) = 46.48, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.21];
Class× Expression [F(3.72,628.58) = 8.20, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.05]).
We found a significant three way interaction between orienta-
tion, class and expression [F(3.64,614.61) = 2.81, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.02].
Interaction between orientation, class and expression comparing
for orientation (Figure 4) showed no significant differences for
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FIGURE 3 | Pairwise comparisons of the main effects of orientation, class and expression. Single asterisk indicates significance at p < 0.001.
FIGURE 4 | Interaction between orientation, class and expression comparing for orientation. Single asterisk indicates significance at p < 0.001.
familiar faces in RTs between upright and inverted condition for
all the expressions; in famous and unknown categories, instead,
RTs were significantly higher for inverted orientation for all the
expressions.
Interaction between orientation, class and expression, com-
paring for expression in upright condition (Figure 5, left part),
showed that just in familiar we found a significant difference
between neutral and negative expressions.
Interaction between orientation, class and expression compar-
ing for expression in inverted condition (Figure 5, right part)
showed that in familiar faces we replicate results of upright con-
dition, in famous faces we found significant differences between
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FIGURE 5 | Interaction between orientation, class and expression comparing for expression. Single asterisk indicates significance at p < 0.001.
negative and both positive and neutral, in unknown faces between
positive and both neutral and negative.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of our study was to evaluate, in a face recognition
task, the effects of different levels of face-familiarity (personally
familiar, famous and unknown faces), orientation (upright or
inverted) and emotional expressions (positive, neutral or nega-
tive). The main results can be summarized as follows: (1) regard-
less of orientation and expression, familiar faces are recognized
faster than other stimuli; (2) inverted orientation does not seem to
delay response times only for familiar faces; and (3) there appears
to be a significant relation between familiarity and expression
which is in turn affected by orientation.
Concerning the first issue, although based on RTs, our data are
consistent with studies that show different psychophysiological
responses for famous than unknown persons (Tranel et al., 1985;
Ellis et al., 1999). In our study, faces of personally familiar people
(relatives, spouse, partner, etc.) are identified more quickly com-
pared to famous and unknown faces across all conditions. These
data are consistent with Herzmann et al. (2004) who found higher
autonomic responses for familiar, compared to both famous and
unknown faces, although RTs did not differ between familiar and
famous stimuli. This discordance can be explained by the different
operative definitions of familiarity: in their study, Herzmann et al.
(2004) used a broad concept of familiarity (portraits of lecturing
staff), while we use a strict notion of familiarity and this difference
may result in different RTs during the recognition task.
The second argument looks at the interaction between orien-
tation and class, showing results that are consistent with studies
that demonstrate RTs increase in face recognition when stim-
uli are inverted, confirming the difficulty of recognizing faces
in this orientation (e.g., Itier and Taylor, 2002). However, we
found this effect only for famous and unknown faces: response
times for inverted familiar faces were not significantly higher
compared to the same stimuli in upright condition. Some authors
claim that the holistic processing used for upright faces is lost
with inversion, and inverted faces, like objects, are processed
only on the basis of their parts (i.e., Farah et al., 1995a,b).
However, most of the studies that tested the effect of inversion
have examined face recognition of famous and unknown people
only (e.g., Itier and Taylor, 2002; Megreya and Burton, 2006).
Hence, absence in literature of similar tasks makes it difficult to
provide an exhaustive explanation of the phenomenon. We can
suppose the holistic configuration is less compromised in inverted
condition in function of familiarity. Further research is however
needed.
Regarding the third issue, interaction between familiarity,
expression and orientation in upright condition, our data show
that subjects are faster in evaluating negative familiar faces than
neutral ones. No differences were found across levels of expres-
sions when famous and unknown faces were shown. Our results
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are consistent with studies that emphasize the joint effect of famil-
iarity and expression in face recognition (Baudouin et al., 2000;
Gallegos and Tranel, 2005; Dobel et al., 2008). One explanation
for this pattern of results is based on the assumption that face
recognition is easier if faces display typical rather than atypical
expressions. So, there is a “perceptual learning” that defines the
type of cognitive representation of known faces (Kaufmann and
Schweinberger, 2004). It has been claimed that famous faces
are depicted more frequently displaying one typical expression
(generally positive) than all possible ones and resulted in faster
recognition when smiling. Our famous stimuli varied for typi-
cal expressions (in the Italian media-context Vittorio Sgarbi is
more frequently portrayed with negative expressions than positive
expressions, unlike Roberto Benigni, while for other stimuli such
as Queen Elizabeth or Barack Obama it is difficult to establish).
This could partially explain the lack of differences in our results
between expressions in this class of stimuli. Nevertheless, percep-
tual learning explanation cannot support our results for familiar
faces. It is difficult to assume that there is a prototypical emo-
tional representation for each family member, since the history
of the relations are too varied to expose a subject to just one
of their emotional expressions. And even if there were, it would
be characterized by an extremely high inter-individual variability.
One could argue that our subjects chose relatives with whom
they had a higher affinity and good relationship and therefore
cognitive representations of them were characterized by positive
expressions. However, it is likely that the “expressive” representa-
tion of a relative is influenced by his character or his personality
but plausibly independent from affection (for example if one has
a taciturn or sulky disposition, his face representation will be
characterized more by a neutral expression than positive, but this
does not imply less affection towards him). So, regarding stimuli
used in this experiment, the absence of a distinctive prototypical
representation was, for different reasons, a common condition for
both familiar and famous faces.
In regard to the inverted condition, some interesting results
were obtained. Emotional expressions had an influence only on
famous and unknown faces. No differences were found between
the three expressions in the “familiar” condition. Literature
regarding the processing of emotive expressions in inverted con-
dition, is quite scarce and heterogeneous. While some studies
show a detrimental effect of inversion on the recognition of all
expressions, apart from positive ones (McKelvie, 1995; Calvo and
Nummenmaa, 2008), some others reported an inversion effect for
all types of emotions (Prkachin, 2003) or even opposite results,
with happy faces being more affected by inversion than the others
(Goren and Wilson, 2006). In our study, despite instructions
not to explicitly recognize the emotions presented, our results
seem to confirm those studies that show an easier processing of
positive expressions also in inverted condition (Leppänen and
Hietanen, 2004; Bombari et al., 2013). Again, familiar faces seem
to constitute a distinct type of stimuli, being minimally affected
by inversion in the analysis of the emotive effect.
PHILOSOPHICAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEW
In division 1 of Being and Time, Heidegger (1996) argues that we
ordinarily encounter objects as equipment, that is, as being for
certain sorts of tasks (hammering, writing, etc.). He states that we
do not generally encounter beings as detached, theoretical entities
[Vorhanden] but as available or “ready-to-hand” [Zuhanden] and
entwined in a tacit, holistic contexture of equipment (Ratcliffe,
2002). This account is reinforced by Merleau-Ponty (1962), who
claims that the perceived object is always contextualized, not just
by its physical surroundings, but by the particular projects and
interests of the perceiver: the particular and potential actions that
the perceiver is engaged in or could be engaged in. As Noë notes:
“Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is
something we do [. . .] What we perceive is determined by what we
do (or what we know how to do); it is determined by what we are
ready to do. In ways I try to make precise, we enact our perceptual
experience; we act it out” (Noë, 2004). Hence, by following a
phenomenological approach, perception is an active process that
is structurally embodied and embedded, but it is possible to argue
that the perception of a person is different when compared to the
perception of objects. Recognizing a human face means to become
aware of a particular kind of percept—the face of another human
being like me—but it does not always mean to identify a “person”:
a person is a human being regarded as an individual, an individual
is a single human being as distinct from all other human beings
(Liccione, 2013). Moreover, in encountering another person the
most pressing task is relational engagement, and the way for
which this engagement can be achieved depends upon many
(inter)subjective and contextual factors, such as facial expressions.
When we perceive an unknown person’s portrait we recognize
a “face” (not an object), but our relational engagement with
him/her is based only on the mere social meaning of his/her
facial expression (i.e., in terms of approach/escape behavior).
So, his/her identity and possible relational engagement are not
interrelated. When we perceive a famous face, like that of Barack
Obama, we really individualize a “person”—Barack Obama—the
current president of the U.S., that is, a human individual with
specified personality characteristics, so our relational engagement
with him is based on our “media” knowledge. In this case, identity
is an important factor but recognition of Barak Obama do not
take the shape of a personal and unique historical pattern of
relational engagements. Instead, recognition of our mother’s face
occurs in a context of an exclusive and unique historical pattern
of interactive opportunities that are so salient as to be constitutive
of their recognition. Identity is a decisive factor.
Burton et al. (2005), proposed that the better recognition of
familiar faces, with respect to unfamiliar ones, is due to a more
functional refinement of stored representations of the former.
This fine-tuning of representations of faces is “exposure-driven”,
that is each new image of a face gradually upgrades its abstract
representation, merging features that are constant across all pos-
sible variations. Our results (lower RTs for familiar faces) can
well fit with this explanation given that it is possible argue that
a person is more exposed to the faces of his/her family members
than to those of celebrities and therefore he/she holds more
powerful abstract representations of the former faces than those
of the latter. Our familiar stimuli encompass several categories
of relatives (e.g., parents, spouse, partner, etc.) for which it is
likely to assume a different frequency of occurrence of encounters
and, consequently, various refinement degrees of their abstract
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representations. Therefore, in order to verify frequency hypothesis
it would be necessary provide experimental control of variables
related to exposure effects (such as length of acquaintanceship
with each relative and how long a subject spent time with
him/her). In this way it would possible to examine if response
times among familiar stimuli are or not affected by frequency of
exposure. We cannot establish it solely with the data of this study.
Exposure time is often referred to domain of vision: Johnston
and Edmonds (2009), correctly wrote that celebrities “may be
very well known to the participants for a long period of time, have
been seen in many different views and contexts, have been seen on
many different occasions, and have been seen for lengthy periods
of time (our italics)”. Let’s take a hypothetical example in which
a family member and a celebrity have the same exposure time to
the subject (i.e., a distant relative and a very famous anchorman).
It is possible to argue that their cognitive representations share
identical degrees of refinement and the same level of robustness to
variation. Nevertheless, there is an important issue in supposing
different qualitative aspects of quantitative exposure to these faces
(famous and familiar targets): the celebrity’s face never “looked”
at me, that is she never directed her gaze toward my person
and, correspondingly, although I have seen his face, I have never
looked at it. There is no real (eye) contact with famous faces since
there is no intentional reciprocity for engagement. According
to Stawarska (2006), mutual gaze implies an attention contact,
yielding social attunement: intentional gaze toward the eyes of
another, returned by him, allows for a second-person relation
while observations without contacts produce a third-person
relation. Cole (1999), claimed that in our social relationship we
“exchange or share a mutual gaze”. Cooperative visual attention
is a considered fundamental step for cognitive development and
especially for social and emotional competences (Stawarska,
2006) and recently Mason et al. (2004) have shown that gaze
direction contributes to the memorability of others. In our
study, subjects were asked to produce a recognition judgment
(whether the face was known or not) and familiar faces were
the only targets for which it is possible to argue a past history
of mutual glances. Moreover, the mutual gaze between members
of the family is affectively characterized, unlike with strangers.
We can argue that these qualitative aspects are doubtless unique
for personally familiar faces, even if exposure is a decisive factor
that strengthens familiarity (Burton et al., 2005), affective and
emotional aspects related to personal narratives with others seem
to play a special role in face processing. In their study (Gobbini
et al., 2004; Gobbini and Haxby, 2007), showed different neuronal
activation patterns in response to familiar faces, compared to
famous or unknown ones, and these data are confirmed by other
fMRI studies (Todorov et al., 2007; Vuilleumier and Pourtois,
2007). As argued by Gobbini et al. (2004) and Gobbini and Haxby
(2007), interpersonal relationships towards familiar members
provide a “person knowledge”, a set of salient biographical and
autobiographical information that are integral components of
cognitive representation of them (our italics).
According to this vision, it is possible to argue that the
encounter with expressive famous faces does not have the same
meaning as that connected to family members, that is the
same quality of personal significance with relatives: expressions
displayed on familiar faces are linked to memories that imply
particular relational engagements and these can co-occur with
recognition. Ratcliffe (2008), argues that “feelings of familiarity
[. . .] or relatedness [. . .] can play a role in constituting the sense
that a perceived entity is a remembered entity”. In other words,
the relational horizons towards “my” mother (also) contribute to
the recognition of her as “my” mother.
Arciero and Bondolfi (2009), claim that “at pre-reflective level,
e-moting is the embodied meaning of an ongoing situation,
perceived as a global mode of feeling and concurrently as a
relational domain”. We can consider the “emotional face” as a
salient cue of this relation domain that discloses new possibilities
of action and passion. Indeed Cole (1999), argues that face-to-face
encounters involve feeling toward and between people and that
other faces put a “demand” on one, that is, it requires responding
and entering into a relationship. So, expressive faces always imply
my Self. Social meaning of facial expressions for Self is often
singled out to explain different behavioral responses to angry and
happy faces: positive expressions evoke approval and satisfaction
with our conduct while angry expressions denote disconfirm
(D’Argembeau et al., 2010). Both confirmation and disconfirma-
tion of the Self move the subject to relational acts (to speak, to
smile, to discuss, to embrace) and in this sense sad expressions
elicit concern and call for caring. We suppose, however, that the
relation between significance of expression and Self is (more)
meaningful when it actually implies the Self. Instead, there are
no angry, sad or happy faces but rather angry, sad or happy
people with which the subject has different relational engage-
ments. Consequently angry an expression by Barack Obama does
not involve a sense of disconfirmation, as it would be as if the
same expression were displayed on one’s mother’s face! The same
can be said for sad and happy expressions. This can explain our
results about interplay between identity and emotive expression
and particularly results for the facilitation role of negative familiar
faces. Indeed negative expressions are associated with “critical”
relational contexts and can similarly imply negative emotional
responses (such as concern, worry, quandary, but also sadness
and anger): we can suppose that when these expressions are
displayed by significant others the Self is more involved because
of significant past relational engagement with them.
To summarize, famous and familiar faces are therefore dif-
ferent in respect to the historical conditions that have shaped
and structured the experience with the person that these images
depict. When we perceive faces, we are required to potentially
actualize relational engaging, but if the faces carry an affective
historical (past), engaging will be better recognized because his-
torical relationships with them have the nature of lived experi-
ences. Therefore, familiarity represents an indispensable condition
for the perception of another’s face to be connected to a history
of relational engagement. It is not a stimulus that is added to
the perceptive structure of the face, but rather an embodied
meaning which manifests itself in the face of a familiar person,
inevitably referring back to the self. This phenomenological point
of view explains why the holistic perception of a familiar face is
maintained even if inverted: in our study, RTs for inverted faces
showed no significant differences compared to those for upright
faces. If we consider familiarity as constitutive to perception,
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and not only as perceptive content, it is therefore plausible that
inversion can in no way act on it, unless the facial structure is so
deformed as to render recognition impossible. In reference to this
inverted condition, the results regarding the relationship between
emotive expressions and class are questionable, for this reason
further research is necessary to repeat the data.
LIMITS
We used a limited set of faces that were repeatedly pre-
sented to subjects across upright and inverted condition. This
may have resulted in a lower uncertainty during recognition
tasks.
We conducted a pilot study to evaluate the recognition of
positive, negative and neutral expressions displayed by famous
faces. We did not plan a similar questionnaire addressed for
assessing same expressions depicted by familiar faces.
We did not collect data for familiar faces regarding (1) length
of acquaintanceship, (2) how long a subject spent time with them
and (3) degree of appreciation for each familiar member. It is
possible to argue that our concept of “familiarity” is independent
(unrelated) to the first two variables (at least) but we cannot
establish it solely with the data of this study.
The results of the present study showed that face recognition is
facilitated by familiarity and emotional expression, emphasizing
the distinction between famous and personally familiar faces and
stressing importance of historical aspects from a phenomenolog-
ical point of view.
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